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transnational border issues. Those issues continue to escalate. Violence and instability in Mexico reached unprecedented levels over the last five years. The U.S. is attempting to neutralize the violence by assisting Mexico through several major interagency efforts.
One of the leading efforts is through a Department of State (DoS) led plan titled the Merida Initiative. To date, the Merida Initiative is only achieving limited success as a strategy to curb violence and the war on drugs. It is possible to do better by improving cooperation and synchronization in the interagency and multinational process.
According to Professor Paul Kan, -defining the nature of the problem brings inherent challenges of establishing U.S. policy to support Mexico but more important, developing a comprehensive strategy that is going to achieve results. The United States remains committed to helping the Mexican Government go after the cartels and organized crime and the corruption they generate….. Our goal is … to provide support and help to enable our Mexican friends and partners to be as successful as they are seeking to be. And we will continue, through the Merida Initiative, to provide significant support.
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To date, the Merida Initiative is only achieving limited success as a strategy to curb violence in support of Mexico's war on drugs but it is possible to do better. By improving cooperation and synchronization between the DoS and other federal agencies like the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Justice (DoJ) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. can reduce the violence and increase stability. This cooperation must include Mexico to facilitate and enhance capacity to mutually address broader and shared security challenges. It's time to get serious about the Merida
Initiative and actually bring all factors together to achieve success.
The objective of this paper is to first provide a better understanding of the current U.S. commitment and interagency efforts to fight the war on drugs inside Mexico and reduce violence along the southwest border. It will cover how the U.S. became involved and the extent of resources committed over the last several decades to this effort. It will present the current circumstances and analyze key issues hindering cooperation and synchronization of U.S. interagency efforts to engender success within the Merida Initiative. Finally, it will propose alternatives through the other elements of national power to redirect the effort in a more positive and fruitful direction. As Professor Paul Kan stated, -defining the nature of the problem brings inherent challenges of establishing U.S. policy to support Mexico but more important, developing a comprehensive strategy that is going to achieve results.‖ 8 One thing is certain, the U.S. must isolate the key issues in order to develop a policy that creates a strategy, applies the proper resources, all able to attain satisfying and tangible results to support Mexico and ensure the security of the U.S.
Background
When Mexican President Felipe Calderon was elected into office in 2006, he immediately turned his focus on the powerful Mexican cartels as the major source of violence perpetrated in the country. The gruesome killings and abhorrent techniques ranging from beheadings, hangings and internments in mass graves, led to Calderon's decision to launch an offensive campaign on the drug cartels. Since taking office he's, at some level, successfully neutralized three of the five major cartels. Two extremely violent and rival cartels, the Zeta's and Sinaloa, dominate the current drug war. Both are competing for the lucrative drug markets and porous trafficking routes into the U.S.
In addition to a growing demand for drugs from the U.S., the weapons used by the cartels come from U.S suppliers. The Obama administration acknowledges the U.S.
is losing the battle to stem the flow of weapons from American guns shops to Mexican drug cartels; all used in tens of thousands of killings. 9 The U.S. Attorney General, Eric
Holder, told a Senate hearing in November 2011, profits from selling illegal drugs in the U.S. are used to buy guns. Those guns transit across the Mexican border to the cartels that use them to protect their operations in a small scale war in order to send more drugs to the U.S. He noted that of the 94,000 weapons captured from drug traffickers by the Mexican authorities, more than 64,000 originated in the US.
10
The conclusion assumption that the origin of most violence in the U.S. is drug related isn't a new one. It has been a national issue for every U. for DoD. The situation in Mexico is not typical of most U.S. policy challenges but one of extreme concern. The near term threat alone is a direct impact on U.S. interest. The NSS states; -the strategic partnerships and unique relationships we maintain with Canada and Mexico are critical to U.S. national security and have a direct effect on the security of our homeland‖. 23 The President further defines the intent of the U.S. by saying; -with Mexico, in addition to trade cooperation, we are working together to identify and interdict threats at the earliest opportunity, even before they reach North America. Stability and security in
Mexico are indispensable to building a strong economic partnership, fighting the illicit drug and arms trade, and promoting sound immigration policy‖. 24 The NMS also makes a specific point by stating; -as part of our shared responsibility to ensure security on both sides of our border, we shall assist Mexican security forces in combating violent transnational criminal organizations‖. intercept the smugglers after the purchases, or recover the guns they had purchased. In some cases, as the government expected, the smugglers delivered the guns directly to
Mexican drug trafficking organizations. The reported purpose of the operation was to track and uncover the entirety of the smuggling operations to more effectively combat them until they completely shutdown. 34 The DoJ has a viable and dangerous role in the southwest border security effort and few ways to curb illegal weapons traffic from the U.S. into Mexico.
Through the guidelines established in the NMS, the DoD is committed to both the drug war and border security efforts. DoD increased its counter-narcotics support to As with many strategies, involving multiple agencies, the ways and means are executed independently to affect a problem. These unilateral operations create gaps and challenges between agencies. There is no requirement for the interagency lead to account for the entire effort.
There is no mechanism to analyze, assess or measure the effectiveness of each agency's contribution national solution. There appears to be a significant breakdown in the synchronization. Just using a simple metric, violence along the border, it is easy to conclude a lack of synergy given the increase of murders over the last five years. Achieving the end-state of the strategy may not be feasible without a coordinated and synchronized effort .
In June 2009, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), in conjunction with DHS and DoJ, issued its National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy. 49 The strategy aims at -substantially reducing the flow of illicit drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence across the Southwest Border. 50 The strategy committed the Obama Administration to enhancing intelligence capabilities; improving controls at ports of entry and in the ground, air, and maritime domains of the border; disrupting the smuggling of guns and bulk currency; disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations; enhancing counterdrug technologies for drug detection and interdiction; and enhancing US-Mexico cooperation in counterdrug operations. 51 However, when you break down all the requirements, goals and objectives in the strategy, it is not clear who is leading or how all of these efforts are coordinated and synchronized with the Merida Initiative and the DoS. The fact is these agencies bring significant capability to bear on the problem is great. Unfortunately, they do so independently. If this continues, void of coordination and leadership, the results may contain violence but has little chance of solving the problem or eliminating cartels.
A major cause for violence in Mexico is attributable to the U.S. demand for illegal drugs. This illegal activity is having a devastating effect on both Mexican and American citizens. Domestically, the White House is sending mixed signals on the War on Drugs.
Senior officials, including the President, declared efforts aimed at reducing supply through eradication, interdiction, and police action a -historic failure‖ and promised a new mix of more rational and effective strategies. 52 Despite this declaration, the White
House has yet to outline a definitive strategy to affect the problem. The White House's information campaign does target U.S. youth population and the anti-drug message but it bears evaluating. The information campaign intends to increase teen exposure to anti-drug messages through a combination of paid advertising and public communications. The campaign attempts to balance prevention messaging at the national level with a targeted effort at the local community level. 53 Yet, while a significant portion of federal funding is appropriated to reduce the demand for drugs, there is little messaging linking to demand to the violence in Mexico.
Public messages need to be more direct, graphic and directly tied to drug and narco-cartel related activities in U.S. and Mexico. Publicly, the U.S. message must identify the problem as a national security risk causing extreme violence and death of innocent citizens on both sides of the border. Additionally, the States. 55 The U.S. funding for counternarcotics and related law enforcement activities increased significantly from pre-Merida levels. Additionally, the current level of collaboration between the U.S. and Mexico is unprecedented. This presents the U.S.
with a unique opportunity to effectively address a mutual problem affecting the region and advance bilateral relationships in Latin America. 56 The George W. Bush administration deserves some credit for starting this DoS led assistance program. The
Obama administration too deserves praise for its continued bi-partisanship support of this very important strategy.
Several of the vital elements of the Merida Initiative are already in place including a clear mission, strategic goals, and a resource plan to support them. It identifies the DoS as lead agency, but this is only for specified initiative programs. There is no authority to oversee, manage and tie in other agency programs to build power through a unified effort. There is simply no dominant lead agency to facilitate accountability and management. 57 Holistic, performance measures indicating progress and strategic goal achievement simply are not available. 58 The The DHS continues to make significant contributions to the security of the U.S.
along the southwest border. By increasing the number of Border Patrol agents and Immigration and Custom agents along the southwest border, they provide some reassurance the U.S. is trying to contain the violence inside of Mexico. Unfortunately, the DHS also has a daunting amount of tasks to achieve and its own flawed assessment criteria.
Although DHS completed 650 miles of fencing along the border, 1300 miles of uncontrolled porous border is not protected by a fence or sufficient manning. Despite the fencing, cartels resort to other methods to cross into the U.S. from Mexico. They use sophisticated tunnels, water routes around San Diego California and through low altitude air space. The remaining fence will never reach completion. Funding, policy restrictions and the success of other means to cross the border make this effort a political albatross.
DHS also harms themselves when using the reduction of illegal aliens attempting to cross the border as a measure of anti drug success. It more likely these illegal aliens are not entering for economic reasons. The struggling U.S. economy and lack of jobs is more likely impacting the reduction and not DHS efforts. DHS will be better served Operations Centers. 65 The challenge is the legal constraints and decreasing budget appropriations placed on the DoD. There is an effort to improve DoD support to local law enforcement agencies along the southwestern border and place the responsibility squarely in their hands.
Currently U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is undertaking a review of both Title 10 and Title 32 (U.S.C.) support along the southwestern border. NORTHCOM is reviewing a National Guard plan to employ 1200 soldiers along the border in a more deliberate campaign. 68 The thought is that DoD might be able to assist with the tailoring of Title 32 resources to fill DHS gaps and increase efficiency. One option is to create an overlapping joint operating area of the U.S. and Mexico for a more collaborative approach and unity of effort with Mexico. But, this will require major planning efforts to organize and establish a Joint Interagency Task Force on the southwestern border. The results don't support a conclusion of success. The elimination of each cartel leader, apparently provokes more bloodshed as key lieutenants war with one another to take over unprotected turf. Since President Calderón took office, there have been more than 45,000 drug-related killings, up from the 7,000 in the last four years of the Fox administration. 72 This is having the disastrous consequence that violence continues to rise.
Mexico is risking the legitimacy of its military and their role as a law enforcement and defense institution. The current -heavy handed‖ approach of the military is creating distrust among the population. 73 Their concentration on the internal threats from cartels is also risking its ability to focus on external threats to the nation. Additionally, the militarization strategy resulted in accusations of serious human rights abuses. A November 2011 report by Human Rights Watch found that "rather than strengthening public security in Mexico, Calderon's 'war' has exacerbated a climate of violence, lawlessness, and fear in many parts of the country." 74 The report, which looked at five states, documented more than 175 cases of torture, 39 disappearances, and 24 extrajudicial killings. 75 .
An essential tool of Mexican traffickers is the corruption of government leaders.
In Mexico their tactics are called silver (plata) or lead (plomo)-money or a bullet. As
Francisco Gonzalez of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies notes, a -root cause of the problem is the drug cartel's extensive penetration of government agencies and co-optation of government officials‖. 76 According to Mexican and U.S. government officials, extensive corruption of Mexican law enforcement at the federal, state, and local levels impedes all efforts to combat drugs and arms trafficking.
Mexican federal authorities are implementing anticorruption measures. These include polygraph and psychological testing, background checks, and salary increases.
However, government officials acknowledge fully implementing these reforms will take considerable time to affect comprehensive change. To date, these efforts have yet to achieve the reduction in corruption or violence and lawless behavior by drug cartels.
Mexico applied a military solution towards a national crisis to no avail. Similar to the reasons that a military led solution is not advisable for the U.S., the Mexican government is running out of time for continued use of its military. Corruption, on the other hand, will continue as long as the lucrative opportunities exist for the drug cartels among influential officials. Until Mexico takes an unrelenting stance against corruption, the drug cartels, violence and illegal drugs, these problem will persist. It is also likely that no solution is viable for Mexico without a cohesive and capable Merida Initiative.
Neither country can solve this alone. They need each other and they need for this strategy to be the conjoined fulcrum that enhances their efforts and defeats the cartels.
Recommendations
With the Presidential elections looming in both countries, 2012 is a critical year.
The election outcome of either country can determine the long term commitment to a crisis that continues to deteriorate. Regardless of the outcome, neither nation will completely abandon their efforts or interagency cooperation. However, it is a certainty their citizens will demand improvement. Therefore, it is imperative that both countries solve the lack of synergy now. Not only must the relevance and relationship of these metrics inform the interagency, they must also inform better synergy with our partner. Finally, pulling together all of the analysis capability resident in each agency into a single repository will facilitate information sharing and collaboration across the agencies. Each element of national power cannot operate independently of each other. To be effective they must be complimentary, work in harmony and assessed routinely to determine their effectiveness or need for strategic adjustments to change.
DoJ plays a pivotal role with the ATF providing a major contribution to combating illegal weapons trafficking into Mexico from the U.S. They also provide the coordinated justice effort on both sides of the border. They cannot lead the overall effort with so much at stake and tied to coordinating all these requirements internally. The same is true for DHS. They cannot lead because of their legal charter to secure the homeland.
Mexico is clearly a sovereign nation and DHS cannot appropriately lead a cross border issue. DHS must better synchronize its capabilities with the other agency efforts.
Leading with the DoD is equally challenging. A military led effort will never have unilateral success. The strict authorities imposed on the military and the affects of militarizing will not enhance the efforts of the Mexican government. As DoD continues to look hard at its fiscal constraints over the next several years, the responsibilities of countering the transnational threats from Mexico may fall largely or solely to the other U.S agencies and state law enforcement.
DoS provides the best option as the lead agency for this issue, to tie the strategy together and support Mexico. There is no argument, the support of DoJ, DHS and DoD is vital. Yet, if the U.S. is committed to assisting Mexico and wants to synchronize the efforts on both sides of the border, the DoS must lead and tie all the initiatives, programs and efforts of all agencies to the Merida Initiative. The national leadership must pin the responsibility and accountability squarely on DoS. More importantly, there must be persistent oversight, scrutiny and testimony to ensure the DoS meets the national policy interest of the U.S. This is not a new revelation and was done effectively by Congress and the national security structure for both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.
All the leadership needs to do is apply the same rigor and place the Secretary of State in the same hot seat it provided GEN David Patreaus.
Conclusion
The Merida Initiative is the gateway for cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico in the battle against Mexican drug the cartels and the problems associated with drugs.
All supporting efforts must work through the Merida Initiative led by the Department of
State. There is no need to develop a new strategy; the plan can work. Success or failure hinges on synchronizing the U.S interagency and ensure their efforts mutually support each other and the Mexican government. If the U.S fails to do this, then the Merida Initiative will not achieve the results both countries expect. Mexico may face catastrophic failure of many government institutions or even collapse of the country if the internal security situation is not fixed. These outcomes will move Mexico closer to anarchy and turn a minimally controlled transnational situation into a full blown transnational crisis. This end will compromise U.S. security and is an unacceptable solution. There is simply no other alternative. It's time to clearly define who will lead, hold the agency accountable for success, give them the structure to effectively execute the strategy and apply the rigor to measure success. To do anything less is failing both nations and the citizens on both sides of the southwestern border.
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